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A MODEL OF GROWTH THROUGH 
CREATIVE  DESTRUCTION 
BY  PHILIPPE AGHION  AND  PETER HowirrT 
A  model of endogenous  growth is developed  in which vertical innovations, generated 
by a competitive research sector, constitute the underlying source of growth. Equilibrium 
is determined  by a forward-looking  difference  equation,  according  to which  the amount  of 
research in any period depends  upon the expected  amount of research next period. One 
source of this intertemporal relationship is creative destruction. That is, the prospect of 
more  future  research discourages  current research by threatening  to  destroy the  rents 
created  by current  research.  The paper  analyzes  the positive  and normative  properties  of 
stationary  equilibria,  in which research employment  is constant and GNP follows a 
random  walk  with drift,  although  under  some circumstances  cyclical  equilibria  also exist. 
Both the average  growth  rate and the variance  of the growth  rate are increasing  functions 
of the size of innovations,  the size of the skilled labor force, and the productivity  of 
research  as measured  by a parameter  indicating the  effect  of  research on  the  Poisson 
arrival rate of innovations; and decreasing functions of the rate of time preference of the 
representative individual. Under  laissez faire the economy's growth rate may be more or 
less than optimal because,  in addition to the appropriability and intertemporal spillover 
effects  of  other  endogenous  growth  models,  which  tend  to  make  growth slower  than 
optimal, the model also has effects that work in the opposite  direction. In particular, the 
fact that private research firms do not internalize the destruction of rents generated  by 
their  innovations  introduces  a  business-stealing  effect  similar  to  that  found  in  the 
partial-equilibrium patent race literature. When we endogenize  the size of innovations we 
find that business stealing also makes innovations too small. 
KEYWORDS:  Endogenous growth,  innovations,  creative  destruction. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE  MAIN CONTRIBUTION of the literature  on endogenous  growth  pioneered by 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) has been to endogenize the underlying  source 
of sustained growth  in per-capita  income, namely the accumulation  of knowl- 
edge. There are many  channels  through  which societies accumulate  knowledge, 
including  formal  education,  on-the-job  training,  basic scientific  research,  learn- 
ing by doing,  process  innovations,  and product  innovations.  This paper  examines 
a channel  that has received  little attention  in the endogenous  growth  literature, 
namely  that of industrial  innovations  which improve  the quality  of products. 
This channel  introduces  into endogenous  growth  theory  the factor  of obsoles- 
cence; better products  render  previous  ones obsolete. Obsolescence  exemplifies 
an important  general  characteristic  of the growth  process,  namely  that progress 
creates losses as well as gains. It also embodies Schumpeter's  idea of creative 
'The  authors  wish to acknowledge  the helpful comments  and criticisms  of Roland Benabou, 
Olivier Blanchard,  Patrick Bolton, Louis Corriveau,  Mathias Dewatripont,  Dick Eckaus, Zvi 
Griliches,  Elhanan  Helpman,  Rebecca Henderson,  Louis Phaneuf,  William  Scarth,  Nancy Stokey, 
Patrick Rey, and the Co-Editor and referees of this journal. 
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destruction  (1942, p. 83, his emphasis): 
The fundamental  impulse  that sets and keeps the capitalist  engine in motion comes 
from  the new consumers'  goods,  the new methods  of production  or transportation,  the 
new markets,....  [This process] incessantly  revolutionizes  the economic structure 
from within,  incessantly  destroying  the old one, incessantly  creating  a new one. This 
process  of Creative  Destruction  is the essential  fact about  capitalism. 
The present paper constructs a simple model of growth through creative 
destruction,  by modelling  the innovation  process  as in the patent-race  literature 
surveyed  by Tirole (1988, Ch. 10) and Reinganum  (1989).  The expected growth 
rate of the economy  depends upon the economy-wide  amount  of research.  The 
paper shows that equilibrium  in such an economy  is determined  by a forward- 
looking difference  equation,  according  to which the amount  of research  in any 
period depends upon the expected amount  of research  next period, similar  to 
the difference  equation  that defines equilibrium  in the two-period  overlapping- 
generations  model of money (Azariadis  (1981), Grandmont  (1985)). 
More specifically,  the model assumes,  following  Schumpeter,  that individual 
innovations  are sufficiently  important  to affect the entire economy.  A period is 
the time between two successive innovations.  The length of  each period is 
random, because of the stochastic nature of the innovation  process, but the 
relationship  between the amount  of research  in two successive  periods can be 
modelled as deterministic.  The amount  of research  this period depends nega- 
tively  upon the expected amount  next period, through  two effects. 
The first effect is that of creative  destruction.  The payoff  from research  this 
period is the prospect  of monopoly  rents next period. Those rents will last only 
until the next innovation  occurs, at which time the knowledge  underlying  the 
rents will be rendered  obsolete. Thus the expected present value of the rents 
depends negatively  upon the Poisson arrival  rate of the next innovation.  The 
expectation  of more research next period will increase that arrival  rate, and 
hence will discourage  research  this period. 
The second effect is a general  equilibrium  effect working  through  the wage of 
skilled  labor,  which  can be used either in research  or in manufacturing.  In order 
to be consistent  with the conditions  for labor-market  equilibrium,  the expecta- 
tion of more research  next period must correspond  to an expectation  of higher 
demand  for skilled  labor in research  next period,  which implies  the expectation 
of a higher  real wage of skilled labor.  Higher  wages next period  will reduce the 
monopoly  rents that can be gained by exclusive  knowledge  of how to produce 
the best products. Thus the expectation of more research next period will 
discourage  research  this period  by reducing  the flow of rents expected  to accrue 
to a successful  innovator. 
This functional  relationship  between research  in two successive  periods  has a 
unique fixed point, which defines a  stationary equilibrium.  The  stationary 
equilibrium  exhibits  balanced  growth,  in the sense that the allocation  of skilled 
labor  between research  and manufacturing  remains  unchanged  with each inno- MODEL  OF  GROWTH  325 
vation; the log of GNP follows a random  walk with drift. This is not always, 
however,  the only equilibrium  in the model. As in the overlapping-generations 
literature  the functional  relationship  can also be satisfied  by cyclical  trajectories. 
One noteworthy  implication  of the negative dependency  of current  research 
upon future research is the possible existence of what we call a "no-growth 
trap,"  a cyclical  equilibrium  in which  the level of research  oscillates  determinis- 
tically between two levels each period, and in which the lower of these two 
levels is zero. An economy  in such an equilibrium  would stop growing  in finite 
time, because with no research  there would be no innovation,  and hence the 
period  with no research  would  never  come to an end. The (rational)  expectation 
that the next innovation  would be followed by a very high level of research 
would discourage  anyone  from undertaking  that innovation. 
Another implication  is that the average  growth  rate of the economy is not 
necessarily  increased  by an increase  in the productivity  of research.  In particu- 
lar, a parameter  change that makes  research  more productive  in some states of 
the world can discourage  research  in other states, by increasing  the threat of 
obsolescence  faced by the product  of research  in those other states, to such an 
extent that the average  growth  rate is reduced. 
From a  normative point of  view, the  average growth rate in  stationary 
equilibrium  may be more or less than socially  optimal  because of the presence 
of conflicting  distortionary  effects. Specifically,  although  the model includes  the 
appropriability  and intertemporal  spillover effects which generate a less than 
optimal  growth  rate in Romer's  (1990)  model, it also has effects  that work  in the 
opposite direction.  In particular,  there is a "business-stealing"  effect of the sort 
familiar from the patent-race literature (Tirole (1988, p. 399)). That is, re- 
searchers  do not internalize  the destruction  of existing rents created by their 
innovations.  When  the size of innovations  is taken as given,  the business  stealing 
effect can lead to too much growth.  In addition,  we find that when the size of 
innovations  is endogenized,  the business stealing effect tends to make innova- 
tions too small. 
Other  papers  in the endogenous  growth  literature  that model  vertical  product 
innovations  include Segerstrom,  Anant, and Dinopoulos (1990), who assume 
that the time between  successive  innovations  is deterministic.  They  have a richer 
intersectoral  structure  than the present paper, and address a different  set of 
questions.  Stokey  (1988) models vertical  product  innovations  and obsolescence 
in  a  perfectly competitive model where innovations are the  unintentional 
by-product  of  learning by doing. The cost-reducing  innovations of  Shleifer 
(1986) can also be interpreted  as vertical  product  innovations.  His model does 
not endogenize  growth,  however,  except in a limited  dichotomous  sense; that is, 
the long-run  average  growth  rate is fixed by the exogenously  specified rate of 
invention,  except  in the singular  case where no inventions  are ever implemented 
and the economy  stops growing. 
Corriveau  (1988) has a discrete-time  analysis  of endogenous  growth  based on 
cost-reducing  innovations  as in Shleifer,  in which  the possibility  of simultaneous 
discoveries  creates a different  kind of "business-stealing"  effect. In his model 326  PHILIPPE  AGHION  AND  PETER  HOWITT 
the payoff to current  research  is independent  of future research  because rents 
to innovations  are assumed  to accrue only in the same period as the research 
from which they resulted.  Grossman  and Helpman  (1991) construct  a model of 
vertical  product  innovation  that explicitly  integrates  the analysis  of Segerstrom, 
Anant, and Dinopoulos  (1990)  with that of the present paper. 
Judd (1985) and Romer (1990) model growth  based on horizontal  product 
innovations,  using the Dixit-Stiglitz  (1977) model of  product variety. These 
models involve  no obsolescence;  new products  are no better than existing  ones. 
They also involve  no uncertainty.  King and Rebelo (1988) introduce  uncertainty 
into an endogenous  growth  model by assuming  a random  rate of return  to the 
accumulation  of human  capital under conditions  of perfect competition. 
Within the patent-race  literature  the paper closest to the present is that of 
Reinganum  (1985), which also emphasizes  the affinity  to creative destruction. 
The present paper adds to Reinganum's  model the general equilibrium  effects 
of future research  on the rents created by current  research,  and of the level of 
manufacturing  employment  on the cost of research.  The paper also generalizes 
the  Reinganum model by allowing the  stream of  innovations to  continue 
forever,  and by explicitly  analyzing  the effect of the future level of research  on 
the prospective  reward  to current  research.2 
Section 2 below presents the basic model of the paper. This basic model 
assumes  for simplicity  that each innovation  creates an economy-wide  monopoly 
in  the  production of  intermediate goods. Section 3  derives the  functional 
relationship  between research in two successive periods that defines equilib- 
rium. It then analyzes the determinants  of the average growth rate and the 
variability  of the growth  rate in stationary  equilibrium.  One of those determi- 
nants is  the  degree of  market power possessed by  an  intermediate-good 
monopolist,  which is parameterized  in the model. Section 4 characterizes  the 
welfare  properties  of stationary  equilibria  in the basic  model, under  the assump- 
tion of  a  fixed size of  innovations. Section 5  introduces the possibility of 
nondrastic  innovations.  Section 6 generalizes the model by allowing research 
firms to choose the size of innovations  as well as their arrival  rate. Section 7 
deals with a strategic  monopsony  effect that has been ignored  until this point in 
the argument,  by which  an intermediate  firm  can extend  the expected  lifetime  of 
its monopoly by hiring more than the short-run  profit-maximizing  amount of 
skilled labor,  at the cost of a higher  real wage. Section 8 relaxes  the assumption 
of a single economy-wide  monopoly in the production  of intermediate  goods. 
Section 9 contains  brief concluding  remarks. 
2 That is, Reinganum's comparative-statics analysis follows the common practice of the patent-race 
literature in taking the  reward to  a successful  innovation as given, whereas  the  following analysis 
shows that the  effect of  a parameter change on the time path of research involves feedback from 
future research to  current research working through the  two above-mentioned  channels: creative 
destruction  and  the  general  equilibrium wage  effect  on  profits, both  of  which  flow through the 
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2.  THE  BASIC  MODEL 
2.A.  Assumptions 
There are three classes of tradeable  objects:  labor, a consumption  good, and 
an intermediate  good. There is a continuum  of infinitely-lived  individuals,  with 
identical intertemporally  additive preferences defined over lifetime consump- 
tion, and the constant rate of time preference r > 0. The marginal  utility of 
consumption  is assumed  constant;  thus r is also the rate of interest. 
There is no disutility  from supplying  labor. There are three categories of 
labor: unskilled  labor, which can be used only in producing  the consumption 
good; skilled  labor,  which can be used either in research  or in the intermediate 
sector;  and specialized  labor,  which  can be used only in research.  Each individ- 
ual is  endowed with a  one-unit flow of  labor. Let  M,  N,  and R  denote 
respectively  the mass of unskilled,  skilled,  and specialized  individuals. 
The consumption  good is produced  using the fixed quantity  M of unskilled 
labor, and the intermediate  good, subject  to constant  returns.  Since M is fixed, 
the production  function  can be written  as 
(2.1)  y =AF(x), 
where F' > 0, F" < 0, y is the flow output of consumption  good, x the flow of 
intermediate input, and  A  a  parameter indicating the  productivity  of  the 
intermediate  input. 
The intermediate  good is produced  using  skilled  labor alone, according  to the 
linear technology 
(2.2)  x=L, 
where L is the flow of skilled labor used in the intermediate  sector. 
Research produces a random sequence of innovations.  The Poisson arrival 
rate of innovations  in the economy at any instant is A4(n, R), where n is the 
flow of  skilled labor used in  research, A a  constant parameter, and  b  a 
constant-returns,  concave production  function.  Both A and  b are given by the 
technology  of research.  There is no memory  in this technology,  since the arrival 
rate depends only upon the current  flow of input to research,  not upon past 
research.  Assume  that skilled  labor  is an essential  factor  in research:  4(0, R) = 0. 
Then an economy that allocates no skilled labor to research will not grow, 
because  it will experience  no innovations.  (The "linear"  case where 0(n, R) = n, 
that is, where R = 0, will be used frequently.) 
Time is continuous,  and indexed by r>  0. The subscript  t = 0,1...  denotes 
the interval  starting  with the tth innovation  (or with r=  O  in the case of t = 0) 
and ending  just before the t + 1st. The length of each interval  is random.  All 
prices and quantities  are assumed  to remain  constant  within  each interval.  If nt 
is applied to research  in interval  t, the length of the interval  will be exponen- 
tially distributed  with parameter  A4(nt, R). 
Each innovation  consists  of the invention  of a new intermediate  good, whose 
use  as  input allows more efficient methods to  be  used  in  producing the 328  PHILIPPE  AGHION  AND  PETER  HOWITT 
consumption  good. Real-world  examples  include such "input"  innovations3  as 
the steam engine, the airplane,  and the computer,  whose use made possible  new 
methods of production  in mining,  transportation,  and banking,  with economy- 
wide effects. An innovation  need not, however, be as revolutionary  as these 
examples,  but might consist instead of a new generation  of intermediate  good, 
similar  to the old one. 
Specifically,  use of  the new intermediate good increases the productivity 
parameter  A in (2.1) by the factor y > 1. There are no lags in the diffusion  of 
technology.4  The most modern intermediate  good is always  produced,  so that: 
(2.3)  At =AOyt  (t  = 0, 
where Ao is the initial  value given  by history.  (Of course,  it is always  possible  to 
produce  the consumption  good using an old technology,  with a correspondingly 
old intermediate  good.) 
A successful  innovator  obtains a patent which it can use to monopolize  the 
intermediate  sector. (Section 8 relaxes this assumption  by allowing  for a finite 
number of monopolistic  competitors.)  The patent is assumed to last forever. 
However,  the monopoly  lasts only until the next innovation,  at which time the 
intermediate  good is replaced by the next vintage. All markets are perfectly 
competitive  except that for intermediate  goods. 
2.B.  The Intermediate  Monopolist's Decision Problem 
For ease of presentation  the analysis  starts  by assuming  that innovations  are 
always  drastic;  that the intermediate  monopolist  is unconstrained  by potential 
competition from the  previous patent. This assumption  will be  relaxed in 
Section 5 below. The intermediate  monopolist's  objective is to maximize  the 
expected present value of profits over the current  interval.  When the interval 
ends so do the profits.  The only uncertainty  concerns  the length of the interval. 
Except in Section 7 below, the monopolist is assumed to take as given the 
amount  of research  at each time, and hence also takes as given  the length  of the 
interval. 
3 Scherer  (1984)  combines  process-  and input-oriented  R and D into a measure  of "used"  R and 
D, which he distinguishes  from pure product R  and D.  He  estimates that during the period 
1973-1978  in U.S. industry  the social  rate of return  to "used"  R and D lay  between  71%  and 104%, 
whereas  the return  to pure product  R and D was insignificant. 
4 Gradual diffusion could be  introduced  by allowing the productivity  parameter  after each 
innovation  to follow  a predetermined  but gradual  path asymptotically  approaching  the limit At, and 
then to jump to At upon the next innovation  and follow a gradual  path approaching  At+1. This 
would produce  a cycle in research  within each interval,  as the gradual  rise in productivity  would 
induce  manufacturing  firms  to hire more  and  more  workers  out of research  until  the next  innovation 
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Let xt  be the flow of the intermediate  good produced by the monopolist 
during interval t.  By (2.2), xt  also equals employment of  skilled labor in 
manufacturing.  The inverse demand curve facing a monopolist charging  the 
price pt (relative  to the numeraire  consumption  good) is the marginal  product 
(2.4)  Pt =AtF'(xt). 
Thus the monopolist chooses  xt  to maximize [AtF'(xt)  -  wt]xt, taking as given 
At and the wage wt of skilled  labor. 
Define the "productivity-adjusted  wage" as wt-  wt/At,  and the "marginal- 
revenue function"  as G(X)  F'(x) + xF"(x). Assume that marginal  revenue is 
downward-sloping  and satisfies  Inada-type  conditions. 
ASSUMPTION  1: G)(x) < 0 for all x > 0, limx  O  G  (X) = oo,  limx  ., 0(x)  = 0. 
Then for any positive wt the monopolist's  choice of output xt is given by the 
first-order  condition 
(2.5)  >9t  =o(  xt ) 1 
or 
(2.6)  xt =(wt), 
where x  is the function 6 -'.  The flow of monopoly profits is 
(2.7)  -rt  =A t(v), 
where  ir(w)  -  (x(co))2F"(I(wG)). Note  that x and vF are each strictly positive- 
valued and strictly  decreasing  for all positive wt. 
An example  satisfying  Assumption  1 is the Cobb-Douglas  example,  in which 
the consumption-good technology is F(x)  = xa,  0 < a < 1, which yields 
(2.8)  Pt =  wt/a,  Tt  =  (  a  ,xt  = (wt/a2) 
2.C.  Research 
There are no contemporaneous  spillovers  in research;  that is, a firm  employ- 
ing the amounts z, s of the two factors in research  will experience  innovations 
with a Poisson arrival  rate of  A4(z,  s), independently  of the inputs of other 
firms.  The objective  of a firm in choosing z and s at each date is to maximize 
the flow of expected  profits  from research: 
(2.9)  A4(z,  s)Vt+1-wtz-w's, 
where Vt  +  is the value of the t + 1st innovation,  and w'  is the wage rate of 
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Because p has constant returns, and because the total flow of specialized 
labor must equal R in equilibrium,  it follows  from the Kuhn-Tucker  conditions 
for maximizing  (2.9) that 
(2.10)  wt  >  'pf(nt)AVt+j,  nt > 0,  with at least one equality, 
where p(nt) --  (nt, R), and nt is the economy-wide  flow of skilled labor used 
in research  during  interval  t. Note that 
(2.11)  p(O)  =  0,  and  (p'(n)  > 0,  (p"(n)  < 0  for all  n > 0. 
As we shall see, all research is conducted by outside research  firms rather 
than by the incumbent  monopolist. Because of constant returns to scale the 
number of  research firms is  indeterminate.  The value Vtl  to  an outside 
research  firm  is the expected  present  value of the flow of monopoly  profits  ?t+  1 
generated  by the t + 1st innovation  over an interval  whose length is exponen- 
tially distributed  with parameter  Ap(nt  +1): 
(2.12)  t+1=  r+A(nt+1  ) 
The reason  why the monopolist  chooses to do no research  is that the value to 
the monopolist of making the next innovation  would be  Vt+I  -  Vt, which is 
strictly  less than the value Vt  + 1 to an outside firm. This is an example of the 
Arrow effect, or replacement  effect (see Tirole (1988, p. 392)). The efficiency 
effect, or rent-dissipation  effect, according to which an outside firm might 
receive a smaller  payoff  from an innovation  than would the present incumbent, 
because of having  to compete  with the present incumbent,  is absent  in the case 
of drastic  innovations  because the flow of profit rt  ?+  in (2.12) is independent  of 
whether  the firm  earning  those profits  has access to the previous  patent.S 
There is an important  intertemporal  spillover  in this model. An innovation 
raises productivity  forever.  It allows each subsequent  innovation  to raise At by 
the same multiple y, and with the same probability  Ap(nt), but from a starting 
value that is higher  by the multiple y than it would otherwise  have been. The 
producer  of an innovation  captures  (some of) the rents from that productivity 
gain, but only during  one interval.  After that the rents are captured  by other 
innovators,  building upon the basis of  the  present innovation, but without 
compensating  the present innovator.6  This intertemporal  spillover  plays a role 
in the welfare analysis  of Section 4 below. 
5If,  instead  of  a  constant-returns  research  technology,  each  firm  had  an  identical  research 
technology with rising marginal cost, then the monopolist  might do some  research, but the Arrow 
effect would imply that the monopolist would do less research than each outside  research firm, as 
shown by Reinganum (1985, Proposition 2) in a similar context. 
6 This is the spillover identified by Romer (1990, pp. S83-S85). MODEL  OF  GROWTH  331 
The model also embodies Schumpeter's  idea of "creative  destruction."  Each 
innovation  is an act of creation aimed at capturing  monopoly  rents. But it also 
destroys the monopoly rents that motivated the previous creation. Creative 
destruction accounts for the term Ap(nt+d) in the denominator  of  Vt+1 in 
(2.12). More research  reduces the expected tenure of the current  monopolist, 
and hence reduces the expected present  value of its flow of rents. 
2.D.  Capital Markets 
The structure  of capital  markets  can be specified  in many  different  ways.  One 
is to suppose  that there is a frictionless  Walrasian  credit  market  in which  future 
expected consumption  can be discounted  at the constant rate r. Another is to 
suppose that there is no credit market.  According  to the latter specification  all 
nonresearch  workers  consume  their wage income at each instant,  the owners  of 
the monopoly  intermediate  firm consume their flow of profits at each instant, 
and research  workers  receive no pay unless their firms  innovate,  at which time 
they are paid in shares of  the next intermediate firm. According to  either 
specification,  all research  firms  could be assumed  to be owned by their workers, 
and (2.9) would represent the expected flow of surplus to be divided among 
them. The crucial  assumption  that utility is linear in consumption  makes these 
different specifications  all equivalent,  by removing  any motive to use capital 
markets  for risk-sharing. 
3.  PERFECT  FORESIGHT  DYNAMICS  AND  BALANCED  GROWTH 
3.A.  Equilibrium 
At any point in time there is only one decision for society to make; namely, 
how to allocate the fixed flow N  of skilled labor between manufacturing  and 
research. Combining  (2.5), (2.7), (2.10), (2.12) and the equilibrium  condition 
N = nt + xt  yields 
(3X1)  ?1p(n  )  r + A.(n  )  ,  nt >0,  with at least one equality. 
Condition  (3.1) determines  research  employment  at t as a function  of research 
employment  at t + 1: 
(3.2)  nt = qi(nt+  )I 
where ,l: [0,  N)-1  R+  is a strictly  decreasing  function wherever  it is positive- 
valued. 
The functional  relationship fr  between research employment  in two succes- 
sive  periods  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1, where  c(nt)  is  the  "marginal cost  of 332  PHILIPPE  AGHION  AND  PETER  HOWITT 
marginal cost,  benefit 
(&  i  (N))  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ 
r 
c(nt)  X,. 
b  (nt , 
!~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~  Xlim  i(m)f 
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.  . 
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FIGURE 1.-The  effect of future  research  on current  research:  no = q,(n1)  and n1 = 4(n2). The 
pair  (0, ng) constitutes  a no-growth  trap. 
research" and b(nt+l)  the "marginal benefit of research," defined by 
6(N  -nt) 
A(p'(nt) 
yir(6(N  -  nt+  1)) 
b(nt+,)  r+Ap(n)+1) 
By (2.11) and Assumption  1, c is strictly increasing, b is strictly decreasing, and 
c(nt)  -*  oo as n  t  -  N. It follows that in the case illustrated  in Figure 1, where 
c(O) <b(O),  tJ(nt+1) is well  defined on [0, N),  and is positive and decreasing if 
and only if 7 nt+1  < i.  In the case where c(0) < b(0),  fr(nt+1)  is identically zero. 
In  economic  terms,  there  are  two  reasons  for  the  negative  dependency  of 
current research on future research, corresponding to the two places  in which 
nt+1 enters the expression for the marginal benefit of research, b(nt+,).  That is, 
a foreseen  increase in research next period discourages research this period (a) 
by raising future wages and hence  reducing the flow of profits ir(CO(N  -  nt  +)) 
to be captured from the next innovation, and (b) by raising the rate of creative 
destruction A p(n  t  +)  next period and hence shortening the expected lifetime of 
the monopoly to be enjoyed by the next innovator. 
A perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE) is defined as a sequence {nt}o satisfying 
(3.2) for all t >  0. In Figure 1 the sequence {no, n1, n2,...  }constructed  from the 
7The critical  value ni  is defined  by c(O)  = b(nl),  unless limn  ,  Nb(n)>  c(O),  in which  case n = N. MODEL  OF  GROWTH  333 
counterclockwise  spiral starting  at no constitutes  a PFE. A stationary  equilib- 
rium corresponds  to a PFE with nt constant. It is defined as the solution to 
n =n 
There exists  a unique  stationary  equilibrium.  As Figure  1 shows,  if c(O)  < b(O) 
then n is positive,  and is defined  by 
,j( N  n)  y 7(  (1( N  n) 
Ap()(n  r + Ai(n) 
In this case growth  is positive because innovations  arrive  at the Poisson rate 
A(n)>  0. If c(0) > b(O)  then n = 0 and there is no growth,  because  the Poisson 
arrival  rate of innovations  is A p(O)  = 0. Henceforth,  assume  that c(O)  < b(O)  and 
n > 0. 
Other equilibria may also exist. A  two-cycle is  a pair (n0,n1) such that 
no = qi(nl) and nl = qi(n0). It defines  a PFE of period  two. If both no and nl are 
positive, the PFE is a  "real" two-cycle. If either no or  nl  is zero, it is a 
"no-growth  trap." In a real two-cycle,  the prospect of high research in odd 
intervals  discourages  research in even intervals,  and the prospect of low re- 
search  in even intervals  stimulates  research  in odd intervals.8  A no-growth  trap 
is the extreme  case in which  the prospect  of high research  in odd intervals  shuts 
down research completely in  even intervals. Although the  no-growth trap 
defines  an infinite  sequence  {nt}0,  the oscillation  will cease after one innovation. 
From  then on no growth  will occur  because no innovations  will occur.  It is clear 
from Figure 1 that a no-growth  trap exists if lim,  -f i(w) = 0 and r  is small 
enough. A  real two-cycle will exist if a no-growth  trap exists and9 c'(n)+ 
b'()  > O. 
Consider the Cobb-Douglas example: F(x)  = x',  with a linear research tech- 
nology p(n)  n. From  (2.8), the equation  (3.3) defining  a positive n is 
1  -a 
(3.4)  1=  r+  A 
8 Shleifer  (1986)  also finds  deterministic  cycles  in a model  of multiple  equilibria  with innovations. 
The source of multiplicity  in Shleifer's  model is a contemporaneous  strategic  complementarity, 
whereby the incentive to innovate this period is stronger  the more innovations  are occurring 
elsewhere in the economy this period. No such strategic  complementarity  exists in the present 
model,  in which  more  research  this period  raises  the marginal  cost of research  without  affecting  the 
marginal  benefit.  Because  Shleifer  assumes  that imitation  destroys  the return  from  innovations  after 
one period, his model does not exhibit  the dependency  of current  research  upon future research 
which underlies  the cycles, as well as the other equilibria,  in the present model. Deneckere and 
Judd  (1986)  also generate  cycles  in a model  of innovations.  Their  cycles  arise  from  local  instability  of 
a unique  equilibrium  rather  than from  multiple  equilibria.  Like Shleifer,  they also do not allow  for 
any effect of future  research  upon current  research. 
9Consider  the second-iterate  function  +2(n). Geometrically,  12 is defined  by reversing  the spiral 
illustrated  in Figure  1; thus no = /i2(n2). Suppose  a no-growth  trap exists.  Then 0 =  +f2(n)  < n for 
small  but positive  n (see Figure  1). Because  c'(ni) + b'(n) > 0, therefore  the counterclockwise  spiral 
in Figure  1 spirals  out in the neighbourhood  of ni,  so that +/,2(n) > n for n close to but less than nu. 
By the continuity  of qf2 there must exist an no strictly  between 0 and n, such that /i2(n0)  =  no. 
Evidently  no,  O(n0) constitute  a real two-cycle. 334  PHILIPPE  AGHION  AND  PETER  HOWITT 
and the condition  for n to be positive  is 
(3.5)  1 <Ay  (  N/'r. 
Since  fr(oo)  = 0, a no-growth trap exists when  r is small. Since10 b'(nf)/c'(n)  -O 0 
uniformly  in r as a -O 0, a real two-cycle  exists  when a and r are small  enough. 
3.B.  Research in Stationary Equilibrium 
The rest of the paper focuses on stationary  equilibria.  Comparative-statics 
analysis  of (3.3) shows the following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  1: The amount of research employment n1  in a stationary equilib- 
rium increases with: (a)  a decrease in the rate of interest r; (b)  an increase in the 
size  y  of  each innovation; (c)  an increase in the total endowment N  of skilled 
labor; or (d)  an increase in the arrival  parameter A. 
This proposition  is intuitive:  (a) A decrease in the rate of interest increases 
the marginal  benefit to  research, by raising the present value of monopoly 
profits. (b) An  increase in  the  size  of  each innovation also increases the 
marginal  benefit to research, by raising the size of next interval's  monopoly 
profits  relative  to this interval's  productivity.  (c) An increase  in the endowment 
of skilled labor both increases the marginal  benefit and reduces the marginal 
cost of research,  by reducing  the wage of skilled labor. (d) An increase in the 
10  In this example 
-yir(,r5(N 
-  n)) 
b(n)  rNn)  and  c(n)  -(N-  n)/A. 
Therefore 
b(n)=  -yii-  (c(N-  n))c5(N-  n)  -  Ab(n)  and  c'(n)  =  -'(N  -  n)/A. 
r+An 
Because  Ab(nf)  =  Ac(n)  =  6(N  -  n),  therefore 
b'(n^)/c'(n^)  =Ay)'(  (t(N  -n^))  +  A 6(N  -  n^) 16'(N  -  n^) 
But  rr'G5(N  -  n))=  -(N  -  n)  and  (N  -  n)  =a2(N  -)a-l  Therefore 
A(N-n)  (  1 
-  r+An  a 
From this and (3.4), 
b (nr)/c (nr)  =  y-  (l  )  (  +  1  _ , )  0  uniformly  in r as a  0.O MODEL  OF  GROWTH  335 
arrival  parameter  decreases  both the marginal  cost and the marginal  benefit of 
research, because on  the one  hand it  results in more "effective"  units of 
research for any given level of employment,  but on the other hand it also 
increases  the rate of creative destruction  during  the next interval.  The former 
effect dominates. 
The above discussion of  result (d) suggests an interesting implication of 
creative  destruction  that could arise if the arrival  parameter  A  were permitted  to 
vary from one  interval to  the  next. Suppose, for example, that with each 
successful  innovation  a new value of A  was drawn  from  the finite set {A1,..., Am} 
according  to a fixed transition  matrix B. Transition  into a high-A  state could 
represent a fundamental  breakthrough  leading to  a Schumpeterian  wave of 
innovations,  whereas  transition  to a low-A  state could represent  the exhaustion 
of a line of research.  Then a stationary  equilibrium  would involve  not one level 
of research  employment  but one for each state. Now consider the effects of a 
ceteris  paribus increase in  A2. This parameter change might raise research 
employment  in state 2, but it would tend to reduce research employment  in 
other states, by increasing  the rationally  expected rate of creative destruction 
during the  next interval. Furthermore,  even though the  parameter change 
represents an unambiguous  improvement  in the productivity  of the research 
technology, it  might reduce the  average level of  research employment in 
stationary  equilibrium.  Indeed, Appendix 1 works out a numerical  example in 
which,  in the limit, as A2  becomes  infinite,  average  research  employment  falls to 
zero. 
The linear  Cobb-Douglas  example  of (3.4) and (3.5) above  yields an additional 
comparative-statics  result by parameterizing  the degree of market power en- 
joyed by an intermediate  monopolist. Specifically,  1 -  a  is the Lerner (1934) 
measure of  monopoly power (price minus marginal cost divided by price), 
(1 -  a) -1  is the elasticity  of demand  faced by an intermediate  monopolist,  and 
1 -  a is the fraction  of equilibrium  revenue  in the intermediate  sector accruing 
to the monopolist,  wt/(wt  + w xt).  Thus, by all measures, the degree of market 
power is measured  inversely  by the parameter  a. 
According  to (3.4), an increase  in the degree of market  power  (decrease  in a) 
increases the  stationary-equilibrium  amount of  research n  whenever n  is 
positive.  According  to (3.5), given  fixed  values  of the parameters  y, A, r, and N, 
the stationary-equilibrium  amount of research will be positive if and only if 
there is at least some minimal  degree of market  power;  that is, if and only if a 
is less than the critical  value 
AyN 
a*--  <  1 . 
AyN + 1 
If the degree of market  power  falls short  of this minimal  value, then the flow of 
monopoly profits from the next innovation  would not be  enough to induce 
positive research  aimed at capturing  those rents even if they could be retained 
forever,  with no creative  destruction  in the next interval. 336  PHILIPPE  AGHION  AND  PETER  HOWITT 
3.C. Balanced Growth 
Real output (i.e. the flow of consumption  goods) in the economy during 
interval  t is 
(3.6)  Yt  =AtF(N  -  ni), 
which implies 
(3.7)  Yt+1  = yyt 
Thus the  time path of  the  log  of  real output ln y(r)  will be  a  random 
step-function  starting  at ln yo = ln F(N  -  ni) + ln AO, with the size of each step 
equal to the constant  ln y > 0, and with the time between each step {A1,  A2'  ...  } 
a sequence  of iid variables  exponentially  distributed  with parameter  A0(nI). This 
statement  and (3.3) fully specify  the stochastic  process driving  output, in terms 
of the parameters  of the model. 
Not surprisingly,  this stochastic process is nonstationary.  Suppose observa- 
tions were made at discrete  points in time 1 unit apart.  Then from (3.7), 
(3.8)  lny(-+  1) =lny(r)  +E(ir)  (T=0,1,... 
where 80r) is ln y times the number  of innovations  between r and r + 1. From 
the above analysis 
(E(0)  E(1) 
In  ly'  In y 
... 
is a sequence of iid variables  distributed  Poisson with parameter  Ap(h).  Thus 
(3.8) can be written  as 
(3.9)  ln y(r + 1) = ln y(r)  + Ap(n) ln y + e(Tr)  (  = 0, 1 
where e(X)  G--()  -  A  'p(nh)  ln y. Note that e(X) is iid., with 
(3.10)  E(e('i))  = 0,  var  e(Ti) = Ap(nh)(ln y)2. 
From (3.9) and (3.10), the discrete sequence of observations  on the log of 
output follows a random  walk with constant positive drift. It also follows that 
the economy's  average  growth  rate (AGR)  and the variance  of the economy's 
growth  rate (VGR) are given  by 
(3.11)  AGR =  Ap(n)  ln y,  VGR =  AP(h)(ln  y)2. 
Combining  (3.11)  with Proposition  1 allows  one to sign the impact  of parame- 
ter changes  on the average  growth  rate. Increases  in the arrival  parameter,  the 
size of innovations,  the size of skilled labor endowment, and (in the Cobb- 
Douglas example)  the degree of market  power all raise AGR.  Increases  in the 
rate of interest  lower  it. The parameter  changes  have the same qualitative  effect 
on VGR as on AGR. The effects are intuitive  and straightforward.  The effect of 
market power, combined with the finding that a minimal degree of market 
power is needed before growth  is even possible, underlines  the importance  of 
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The example of Appendix 1 shows, however,  that in a more general setting 
where the arrival  parameter  A can vary  from state to state, it is not always  true 
that an unambiguous  improvement  in the productivity  of the research  technol- 
ogy will increase  the economy's  average  growth  rate. Instead,  an increase  in the 
arrival parameter in  one  state can discourage research in  other states by 
increasing  the rationally  expected rate of creative  destruction  to such an extent 
that the economy's  average  growth  rate falls. 
4.  WELFARE  PROPERTIES  OF THE  STATIONARY  EQUILIBRIUM 
This section compares the laissez-faire average growth rate derived above 
with the AGR that would be chosen by a social planner  whose objective  was to 
maximize  the expected present value of consumption  y(r). Since every innova- 
tion raises y(r) by the same factor y, the optimal  policy  consists  of a fixed level 
of research.  Expected  welfare is 
000 
(4.1)  U  e-rr  EH(t,  T)AtF(  -  n) dT, 
0  t=O 
where H(t, r) equals the probability  that there will be exactly t innovations  up 
to time T. Given that the innovation  process is Poisson with parameter  Apo(n), 
we have 
(4.2)  H(t,  r)  = (A9(n)T)te-A@(n)Tt 
From (4.1) and (4.2), 
AOF( N-n) 
Equation  (4.3) identifies U as the initial flow of output AOF(x) discounted  at 
the  rate  r -  A(p(n)(y -  1). This  "social  discount  rate" is  less  than the  rate of 
interest r  because the  stream of  output will be  growing over time. More 
specifically,  the  social discount rate is  the  rate at which each risk-neutral 
individual  in the economy  would  capitalize  a stream  that was perpetually  subject 
to increases by the factor (y -  1) with a Poisson arrival  rate of  A*p(n),  and 
constant  otherwise. 
The  socially optimal level of  research n*  maximizes U.  The  first-order 
condition  for an interior  maximum  is 
44)  F'(N  -n*)  (y  -1)F(N  -n*) 
Aspt(n*)  r  r-Ap(n*)(y  -1) 
(If no solution exists to (4.4) then n* = 0.) This level of research  would produce. 
an average growth rate of  Ap(n*)lny.  Accordingly  laissez-faire  produces an 
average growth rate more (less) than optimal if n > (<)n*.  Which way these 
inequalities  go can be checked by comparing  (4.4) with the equation determin- 338  PHILIPPE  AGHION  AND  PETER  HOWITT 
ing the stationary  equilibrium  level of research  ni: 
(N  -fi)  yi=(4(  N -n)) 
3  Ap'(fi)  r + AP(n) 
There are four differences  between (4.4) and (3.3). The first  is that the social 
discount rate r -  A<p(n)(y  -  1) appears in (4.4) instead of the "private discount 
rate" r + A<p(n).  The social rate is less than the rate of interest, whereas the 
private  rate is greater.  This difference  corresponds  to the intertemporal  spillover 
effect discussed in Section 2. The social planner takes into account that the 
benefit to the next innovation  will continue forever, whereas the private re- 
search  firm  attaches  no weight  to the benefits  that accrue  beyond  the succeeding 
innovation."1 
The second difference  is that total output F(N - n*)  appears  on the right- 
hand side of (4.4) instead  of the flow of profits  i(J(N  -  ni))  that appears  in the 
marginal  benefit in (3.3). This is the "appropriability"  effect familiar  from the 
patent-race  literature. 
The third difference is that the factor (y -  1) in (4.4) replaces y  in the 
marginal  benefit of (3.3). This corresponds  to a "business-stealing"  effect. The 
private research  firm does not internalize  the loss to the previous  monopolist 
caused by an innovation.  In contrast,  the social planner  takes into account  that 
an innovation  destroys  the social return  from the previous  innovation.12 
The fourth difference is that the marginal  product F'(N - n*)  appears in 
(4.4) in place of the wage J(N  -  ni) in the marginal  cost in (3.3). This is a 
"monopoly-distortion"  effect which does not appear in the partial-equilibrium 
patent-race literature. Specifically,  the  social cost  of  research employment 
exceeds the private  cost because in laissez-faire  the alternative  user of skilled 
research  labor is a monopolist. 
11 Two additional  spillovers  could easily be included.  First, researchers  could benefit from the 
flow  of others'  research,  so that an individual  firm's  arrival  rate  would  be a constant-returns  function 
of its own and others' research.  Second, there could be an exogenous  Poisson arrival  rate ,  of 
imitations  that costlessly  circumvent  the patent laws  and clone the existing  intermediate  good. Both 
would  have the effect of lowering  AGR. Also, as shown  in Aghion  and Howitt  (1988),  the inclusion 
of A would  introduce  another  source  of cycles  in the economy,  since each imitation  would  make  the 
intermediate  industry  perfectly  competitive,  which  would  raise  manufacturing  employment,  until the 
next innovation  arrives. 
12 In the patent-race  literature  the business-stealing  effect is usually derived in a symmetric 
model with no incumbent,  in which all research  firms  enjoy  some positive  surplus  because  there is 
no free entry.  An example  is Mortensen  (1982),  who identifies  the business-stealing  effect with the 
comment:  "Wasteful  competition  arises  because  none of the contestants  takes  account  of the loss of 
the prospect  that others  suffer  when the former's  discovery  ends the game"  (p. 970). In the present 
paper  the loss accrues  not to the other research  firms,  whose value remains  equal to zero, by free 
entry,  even after an innovation  by another  firm,  but to the incumbent  monopolist  who, because  of 
the replacement  effect, has chosen not to participate  in the patent race. As Tirole (1988, p. 399) 
notes,  there is another  negative  externality  that  would  occur  if the research  technology  had memory. 
Specifically,  a firm  might  engage  in research  in order  to reduce  the probability  that its rivals  will  win 
the race.  This effect is absent  from  the present  model,  in which  one firm's  research  has no effect on 
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The intertemporal-spillover  and appropriability  effects tend to  make the 
laissez-faire  average  growth  rate less than optimal,  whereas the business-steal- 
ing and monopoly-distortion  effects tend to  make it  greater than optimal. 
Because these effects conflict  with each other, the laissez-faire  average  growth 
rate may be  more or  less  than optimal. This can be  seen  in  the  linear 
Cobb-Douglas  example,  where n* and n satisfy 
1 
A(y-1)  -  (N-n*) 
(4.5)  1=  r-An*( 
1 -a) 
Ay  --  (N  n) 
(3.4)  1=  r+An 
In this example, the appropriability  and monopoly-distortion  effects are com- 
bined in the presence of the factor (1 -  a) in (3.4); together  they tend to make 
the laissez-faire  AGR less than optimal.  This combined  effect together  with the 
intertemporal-spillover  effect dominates  when the size of innovations  y is large, 
in which case13  n < n*. However,  when there is much  monopoly  power  (a close 
to zero) and innovations  are not too large, the business-stealing  effect domi- 
nates, in which case'4  n > n*. 
5.  NONDRASTIC  INNOVATIONS 
Until this point the analysis  has assumed  that innovations  are drastic;  that the 
intermediate  monopolist  is not constrained  by potential  competition  from own- 
ers of previous  patents.  The present  section shows  that the analysis  of stationary 
equilibria  can be generalized  to the case where innovations  are nondrastic. 
Innovations  are nondrastic  if and only if the previous  incumbent  could make  a 
positive profit when the current one was charging  the price pt =A,F'(1(o,)) 
which yields an unconstrained  maximum  to the current incumbent's  profit. If 
innovations  are nondrastic,  the current  incumbent  sets the maximum  price that 
gives the previous  incumbent  nonpositive  profits,  and satisfies  all the demand  at 
that price, leaving  none to the previous  incumbent. 
The  previous incumbent could make a  positive profit if  and only if  a 
competitive  producer  of consumption  goods could produce  at an average  cost of 
less than unity by combining  unskilled labor with the previous incumbent's 
good, buying  the latter at a price equal to its average  cost of production  wt;  that 
13  From  (4.5), as y rises to the upper limit 1 + r/AN, n* approaches  N while, from (3.4), n' is 
bounded  below  N. 
14If  1/a>  1 + r/AN,  then n>  for all  ,  whereas if  ay  l+oar/AN,  then n*=O.  These 
inequalities  are compatible  with the condition  derived  below for innovations  to be drastic,  namely 
that y >  aa,  as can be verified with the example: a  = 1/2,  y = r2,  r/AN  = 2(W2 -  1). 340  PHILIPPE AGHION AND PETER HOWITT 
is, if and only if the condition 
(5.1)  C(w,w,  W)  <At 
were to  hold with strict inequality, where wm is  the  equilibrium  wage of 
unskilled  labor and C is the unit-cost  function associated  with the production 
function F. 
In equilibrium  all the unskilled  labor  is combined  with  the current  incumbent's 
intermediate  good. Thus the unskilled  wage must satisfy  the competitive  equilib- 
rium  condition: 
(5.2)  C(wtm, pt) =At. 
It follows that innovations  are nondrastic  if and only if (5.1) holds with strict 
inequality  when w/m  satisfies  (5.2) together  with pt =At F'(i(ct)).  It also follows 
that if innovations  are nondrastic  then Pt and w/m satisfy  (5.2) and (5.1) with 
equality. 
In the Cobb-Douglas  example,  where the unconstrained  optimal  price for the 
current  incumbent  is wt/a,  innovations  are nondrastic  if and only if 
(5.3)  y < a-, 
in which case15 
(5.)  Pt  =  laW  t,  7t=  (y  /a  -wtxtg  xt  =  (Y 1/aZ  wta) 1/(a  -1) 
The rest of the analysis  of this section will focus on stationary  equilibria  with 
positive growth  in the linear Cobb-Douglas  example. 
The analysis  assumes  that the monopolist  chooses to do no research,  as in the 
case of drastic  innovations.  This implicitly  places a lower bound on the size of 
innovations,  because it requires the efficiency effect to be  smaller than the 
replacement  effect. Appendix  2 shows that the condition 
(5.5)  y1/aY(1 +  y-1)  > y-1  + min {y2/a,  a-1} 
is sufficient  for the monopolist  to do no research.  Note that this condition is 
satisfied  when y is close to the value a -  at which innovations  become drastic. 
If there is positive  research  during  interval  t, then, as before, 
(5.6)=  + 
A56  w(P  n' )  r + ASD(  nt+ I 
15 In the Cobb-Douglas  example,  the unit-cost  function  is 
c  wM,  p)-(1  (X  -a)-apa(WM)I-a 
It follows from this and (5.2) that if the incumbent  charged  the unconstrained  profit-maximizing 
price a-1lw,, the unskilled  wage would be wfm  =  (1 -  a)a  2a/(1-a)A  t(W/A  t)-a/(l-a).  Putting  this 
into (5.1) yields the condition y<  a-a.  Treating (5.1) as an equality and solving it and (5.2) 
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In a stationary  equilibrium  with positive  growth,  (5.4) and (5.6) imply 
(5.7)  1 =Ay(yl/a-  1)(N-n) 
(5*7)  1 = -  r + An^ 
Equation  (5.7) defines  the stationary  equilibrium  level of research  n. It is the 
same as the equation (3.4) that applies in the drastic case, except that the 
markup  yl/a  in (5.7) replaces  the markup  a1  in (3.4). The comparative-statics 
results  of Proposition  1 apply  to the solution  of (5.7). In addition,  the stationary 
equilibrium  level of research defined by (5.7) is increased by an increase in 
market power (a decrease in  a)  as in the drastic case. Thus in the linear 
Cobb-Douglas  example  all the comparative  statics  results  derived  for the case of 
drastic  innovations  are valid also when innovations  are nondrastic. 
Comparison  of (5.7) and (4.5) shows  that the same welfare  effects analyzed  in 
Section 4 operate in the case where innovations  are nondrastic,  again  with the 
result that research and growth  under laissez-faire  may be more or less than 
optimal.16 
As is customary  in the patent-race  literature  this analysis  has ruled out the 
possibility  that the current  and previous  incumbent  might  contract  to share the 
higher  monopoly  profits  that could be earned if the previous  incumbent  agreed 
never to compete. For example,  the previous  incumbent  might  sell its patent to 
the current  one; in the extreme  case where the previous  incumbent  always  had 
no bargaining  power in negotiation with the current one, competition from 
previous  vintages  of the intermediate  good  would  never  constrain  the monopolist, 
and the above analysis  of drastic  innovations  would apply  no matter  how small 
the innovations  were. 
6.  ENDOGENOUS  SIZE  OF INNOVATIONS 
This section generalizes the  analysis of  stationary equilibria by allowing 
research  firms  to choose not only the frequency  but also the size of innovations. 
It shows  that under  laissez-faire,  innovations  will be too small  if they are drastic. 
In the nondrastic  case, the tendency  to make innovations  too small is at least 
partly mitigated by the  incentive for innovators to  move away from their 
competitive  fringe,  which they can do by increasing  the size of innovations. 
Assume that the arrival  rate of innovations  to a firm employing  the factor 
combination  (z, s) and aiming  for innovations  of size y is A4(z, s)v(y), where 
v'(y) < 0; the  bigger the  innovation, the  harder it  is  to  discover. Assume 
v"(y) < 0; the marginal  cost (in terms  of lower arrival  rate) of aiming  for larger 
innovations  increases  with the size of innovations.  Then the product  yv(y)  is a 
concave  function  of y. 
16 Suppose  y = C2 and a = 1/2. To get hn  < n* let r approach  (V's  -  1)AN from  above;  then n* 
approaches N  whereas ni is bounded below N. To get n > n*  let r = 2(V2 -  1)AN; then n* = 0 and 
n > 0. In either  case y = a-,  but the example  is robust  to a small  decrease  in y that would  satisfy 
the necessary  and sufficient  condition  (5.3) for innovations  to be nondrastic  without  violating  the 
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The  analysis focuses again on  stationary equilibria with positive growth. 
Consider  first the case of drastic  innovations.  By the same logic as before, the 
payoff  to the t + 1st innovator  is 
(6.1)  At1+=  +  ( A)V(A) 
where 5 is the stationary-equilibrium  value of y. If the t + 1st innovation  has 
size  y, not necessarily equal to  A,  then  A+  1 -  yAt  and Vt  + 1 = yVt. Therefore 
the expected flow of profits  to the research  firm  in interval  t is 
(6.2)  AA(z, s)v(y)y7Vt-wtz-ws. 
The firm takes Vt as given. Thus its profit-maximizing  choice of y  also maxi- 
mizes the product v(y)y.  Because this product is a concave function of  y, 
therefore 5 is defined  by the condition17 
(6.3)  v(9)  +  Av'(9)  =  0. 
The first-order  condition for profit maximization  with respect to skilled labor, 
together  with (6.1) produces  an expression  analogous  to (3.3): 
Ji(N  -fn)  v(A)A(  dN  -A)) 
(6.4)  ApA'(n)  r + Ap(n)v() 
The comparative  statics  analysis  of Section  3 carries  through  unchanged,  since 5 
is determined  by (6.3) independently  of all parameters  that do not enter the 
function v, with the obvious exception that it  is  no  longer permissible to 
investigate  the effects of a change in y. 
As in Section 4, the expected  present  value of consumption  equals 
(6.5)  U=  ~~  AOF(N-n) 
(6.5)~  U=  rAip(n)  v(y)  (y -1 
where the denominator  is the social discount  rate. Therefore,  independently  of 
the  choice of  n,  the  social planner will choose y  so  as to  maximize the 
expression  v(y)(y -  1). The socially  optimal  value y* is then defined  by 
(6.6)  v(y*)  + y*v'(y*)  -  v'(y*)  = 0. 
By concavity  of yv(y),18  5 < y*.  Innovations  are too small under laissez-faire. 
This result is another manifestation  of the business-stealing  effect. The social 
planner  chooses y so as to maximize  the arrival  rate multiplied  by the net size 
(y -  1) of  innovations,  whereas the  private research firm, which does not 
internalize  the loss of the existing  vintage of intermediate  good, maximizes  the 
arrival  rate times the gross size y. 
17 Note that it is always possible to choose the function v so that the solution to (6.3) satisfies the 
condition for innovations to be drastic in the Cobb-Douglas example: y > a-. 
18 Since v' < 0, (6.6) implies that v(y)y  is locally decreasing at y*,  so that y*  exceeds the point  y 
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The socially  optimal level of research  employment  n* satisfies  the condition 
67)  F'(N-n*)  v (y*) (y* -1)  F(N  -n*) 
ACp'(n*)  r -Ap(n*)v(y*)(y*  1) 
Comparison  between (6.4) and (6.7) reveals the same welfare effects as in the 
analysis  of Section 4. In addition,  the fact that y <-y* in itself makes n < n*. 
This is because,  as we  have seen,  v(9)(9  -  1) < v(y*)(y*  -  1). So if the other 
four effects  were absent,  and both n and n* were determined  by (6.7), the effect 
on research  employment  would be the same as if the laissez-faire  economy  had 
a smaller  arrival  parameter  A, which  would reduce n below n*. 
The economy's  average  growth  rate A(n)v(  )ln y is affected  by the fact that 
innovations are too  small under laissez-faire, although the direction of  the 
overall effect is ambiguous.  The direct effect on ln 
A  is to decrease AGR. The 
direct effect on the arrival  rate Apn  v(y)  is to increase AGR. The indirect 
effect on the arrival  rate working  through  (n) is to decrease AGR. 
In the nondrastic  case, the above  business-stealing  effect whereby  innovations 
are too small  under  laissez-faire  is mitigated  by an additional  effect, namely  that 
private  innovators  tend to increase the size of innovations  in order to increase 
their profit  margins.  This margin  is independent  of the size y in the drastic  case 
but it increases  with y in the nondrastic  case. (In the Cobb  Douglas  example  the 
profit  margin  is a-1  -  1 if the innovation  is drastic  and y'/a  -  1 if nondrastic.) 
The following example shows, however, that this additional "profit-margin" 
effect does not necessarily  overturn  our earlier result to the effect that innova- 
tions are too small. 
EXAMPLE:  Let  P(n) =  n,  F(x)  =  /2 . From (5.3) innovations  are nondrastic 
if  y <  12.  From  (5.4),  the  payoff  to  the  (t + 1)st  innovator  in  a  stationary 
equilibrium  is 
(Y2_ 1)X(Ay)W,+1 
(6.8)  Vt+1  r+  Av()  _(N-x(  A,y)) 
where x(d, -y)  =  (2dy2)-2.  In (6.8), y is the size of innovation  to be chosen by 
the innovator  during  interval  t, whereas y and di denote stationary-equilibrium 
values which the innovator  takes as given. As in the drastic case, w +1 =yw . 
Therefore 
A  must solve the equation 
V(y)(y2  -  1)x(  ,y)ywt 
y =  arg  max 
v( 
A  a 
{y)  r+AV(y)(NX(w,  y)) 
Since dx/dy < 0, we have 
y  < argmax  v(y)(y2  -  1)x(o,  y)y =  7 
From the above analysis  we know that 
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Therefore  a  sufficient condition for  < y*  is  that  (-2  -  1)x(d,y)y  = 
(y -  1)g(y) with g'(y) < 0. The latter is true,  9 with g(y)  (y + 1)y/4j2y4. 
7.  STRATEGIC  MONOPSONY  EFFECT 
In this section the i'ntermediate  firm is assumed to take into account its 
influence  on the amount  of current  research  and thereby  on the probability  of 
its replacement.  In particular,  by increasing  its demand xt for skilled  labor,  the 
monopolist  can raise the wage rate that must also be paid to skilled  workers  in 
research.  The effect is to reduce the equilibrium  amount of research nt and 
consequently  to delay  the arrival  of the (t + 1)st innovation.  The monopolist  will 
trade this gain off against  the higher  wages it must pay its own skilled labor. 
The  analysis focuses on  stationary equilibria with positive growth. The 
monopolist  during  interval  t chooses xt to maximize  the expected  present  value 
of profits: 
=  (AtF'(x)  -  wt)x 
r+Ap(N-x) 
subject  to 
(* )  wt  A  Ap'(  N-x)Vt+, 
where (*) follows from (2.10). The magnitudes xt,  nt, Vt/At, and wt/At are 
constant,  at the equilibrium  values x, Ti,  V, and  -. Therefore  x solves 
(7.1) 
[ F'(x)  - Ay~p'(N -x)V]x 
(7.1)  V=  max  r  (  A1p(N-)V]x 
The first-order  condition  is 
(7.2)  F'( x)  +xF"(x)  = AV[(y-  1)p'(N-x)  -xyp"(N-x)J. 
From  the constraint  (*), 
(7.3) 
- = AyqP'(N-x)V. 
From  (7.2), (7.3), and the definition  of 6, 
(7.4) 
[y  -1-  y(N -)qp"(1)/AP'(O)  j6(N-i)  -  (n). 
It follows that the stationary-equilibrium  level of research Ti is given by the 
analogue  to (3.3): 
6@(N-n)F1  1  ______ 
(7  [  Ap'(i)  j  [  y -1-  y(N  -  fi)qP"(ni)/P'(n)  J  r + AP(n) 
19 Because it compares y*  with f,  this analysis would apply even if the research firm ignored the 
legative effect that its choice  of  y has on the value of  an innovation by reducing the equilibrium 
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where the function 7F  is defined as 
(7.6)  rrT(ni)  --F'(N  -nT)  - (T)]  (N - n-) 
Assume that the expression  (N  n)'p"(n)  is nondecreasing  in n. Then the 
left-hand  side of (7.5) is increasing  in n-.  If the right-hand  side is still decreasing, 
then the solution to (7.5) is unique. It is straightforward  to verify that all the 
comparative  statics  results  in Proposition  1 apply  to this solution,  and that in the 
Cobb-Douglas  example the solution is an increasing  function of the degree of 
market  power. 
Welfare  analysis  of stationary  equilibria  is somewhat  affected  by the strategic 
monopsony  effect, but the overall result remains,  namely that the laissez-faire 
average  growth  rate may  be more or less than optimal.  Comparison  of (7.5) with 
(4.4) reveals  the same intertemporal-spillover,  appropriability,  business-stealing, 
and monopoly-distortion  effects as before, although the monopoly-distortion 
effect will be quantitatively  different  because Fr(n)  #  i+(J(N  -  n)).  There is an 
additional  effect, however,  from the presence of the term 
y -  1 -  y( N -n)  "  /'()J 
on the left-hand  side of (7.5). This additional  effect is the "monopsony-distor- 
tion" effect. 
In the linear case, where so"  is zero, the constraint  (*) indicates that the 
intermediate  firm's  wage rate is independent  of the amount of skilled labor it 
hires, so the monopsony-distortion  effect induces  it to hire more skilled  workers 
in order to reduce the amount of current  research,  and hence the amount of 
creative  destruction.  The effect just cancels the business-stealing  effect, as can 
be seen by multiplying  both sides of (7.5) by (y -  1)/y.  Thus in the linear 
Cobb-Douglas example, research and growth are unambiguously  less  than 
optimal. 
In the general case where Sp"  < 0 the monopsony-distortion  effect is ambigu- 
ous, because hiring more skilled labor increases the intermediate  firm's  wage 
rate at the same time that it reduces creative destruction.  Because of these 
conflicting  tendencies it is straightforward  to construct  examples  in which the 
overall  monopsony-distortion  effect vanishes.  More specifically,  given any speci- 
fication  of the model it is possible to perturb  the research  function So  in such a 
way20  that n and n* remain unchanged  and the solution ni to (7.5) becomes 
equal to n/. Since n/  can be more or less than n* it follows  that ni  can be more or 
less than n*. 
The rest of the paper ignores the strategic  monopsony  effect, by assuming 
that intermediate  firms  take as given the wage of skilled labor and the amount 
20Just  perturb  'p  in such a way  that p(ni),  q(n*), 9'(n'),  and 9'(n*)  remain  unchanged,  but e"(h) 
is made equal to  -9'(ni)/y(N  -  n). This can be done without altering  the sign of  ''  and '"  on 
[0,  N).  According  to (3.3) and (4.4), ni and n*  will be unchanged.  This perturbation  makes the 
second  factor  on the left-hand  side of (7.5) equal  to unity  when ni =  n', and makes  i,(ni) = 4Kr((N  - 
ni)).  Since ni solves  (3.3) it will now also solve (7.5). 346  PHILIPPE  AGHION  AND  PETER  HOWITT 
of  research. This assumption is  based on  our belief that the  effect is  not 
important,  because it derives  from the simplifying  assumption  that there is only 
one intermediate  firm  in the economy.  If there were many  competing  intermedi- 
ate firms,  as in the next section, each might  plausibly  regard  itself as too small  to 
affect the skilled  wage or the amount  of research. 
8. MANY INTERMEDIATE GOODS 
This section relaxes the simplifying  assumption of  a single economy-wide 
monopoly in intermediate  goods. Suppose instead that there are m different 
intermediate  sectors.  Output  of  the  consumption  good  is  y, = ETl 1Ai,F(xi,), 
where xi,  denotes the flow of  output of  the  ith  intermediate good during 
interval t, and where F  has all the properties assumed above. (This requires 
that each sector have its own specialized  brand  of unskilled  labor.) 
Following  Shleifer  (1986), suppose that innovations  arrive  in different  sectors 
in a deterministic  order.21  Specifically,  the innovating  sector is always  the one 
with the lowest productivity  parameter  Ait,  Each innovator  becomes a local 
monopolist in that sector for a period of  m  successive innovations, and is 
replaced by the last of those m innovations.  Let At  denote the productivity 
parameter  in the leading sector,  where an innovation  has arrived  most recently. 
Assume that Ait = y(l-k)/mA  when i is the kth most advanced  sector. Then y 
is again the size of each innovation  relative to the previous  vintage of good in 
the same sector. 
Let xk  denote the stationary-equilibrium  employment  of skilled labor in the 
kth most advanced  sector. Then xk maximizes  the flow of profits: 
[ Aty(l  k)/mFf  ( Xk)  -  Wt  I Xk 
Therefore, 
Xk  =X(  W), 
where x is defined  as above  and w is again  the stationary-equilibrium  productiv- 
ity-adjusted  wage, w,/At. The productivity-adjusted  flow of profits  in the kth- 
leading sector is 
vr k/At  =  y(1-k)/  m  . (y  (k  l  )/m,) 
21  The alternative of allowing innovations to be randomly distributed across sectors is analyzed in 
an Appendix  to  an  earlier version  of  this  paper,  available from the  authors upon  request.  This 
Appendix assumes a continuum of sectors and a continual flow of innovations. Whoever innovates at 
date  r  is thereby allowed to enter  a randomly chosen  sector with the  "leading technology" A(r), 
where  A(ir) grows continuously at the  exponential  rate o-An. The  possibility that the  same sector 
might receive  two innovations in rapid succession,  before  the  leading technology  has advanced by 
much, implies that in stationary equilibrium some positive (and endogenous)  fraction of innovations 
will be  nondrastic.  The  model  yields  all  the  comparative-statics  results  of  Proposition  1  above, 
except possibly for result (b). MODEL  OF  GROWTH  347 
The productivity-adjusted  wage is the solution  to the equilibrium  condition 
m 
N=n  +  Ex  (Y(ki-)/m), 
k==1 
which can be written  as 
Ct=  c(N-n), 
where the function d^  satisfies  Assumption  1 above. 
Let  the  technology of  research be  the  same as before, with an  arrival 
parameter  equal to mA.  The length of each interval  is distributed  exponentially 
with parameter  mAqp(n),  and each local monopoly  lasts for m intervals.  Let rt 
denote the time of the tth innovation.  Then the value of the tth innovation  is 
m  k 
Vt  =  E:  E( e  - r(Tt +k  - I 
- Td  rt+kmA()1 
k=1  \r +mA~p(n)J 
m  mA~p(n)  kl  ()(-/)A 
k=1tr+  mA(p(n)  r+mAp(n).)' 
and the condition for a positive stationary-equilibrium  level of research  is the 
analogue  to (3.3): 
(8.)  (N-)  m  (  mA(n)  k-1  y1/m+[y(k-1)/m&(Nh  ^)] 
mAp'(n)  k=1  k  r+mAp())  (  r+mA(p(n) 
In the linear Cobb-Douglas  example  this condition  is the analogue  to (3.4): 
m  kl/m  W-1An 
EY(k-1)/m(a-1) 
'Y/(mA  ) 
/  1-a!  \  1  ~~~(  r + mAn^)k 
(8.2)  1 = mA  (N -n)  m. 
a  E  7(k-1)/m(a-1) 
1 
Since the right-hand  side of (8.1) is a decreasing  function22  of  n and.  the 
left-hand  side an increasing  function,  the solution to (8.1), if it exists, is unique. 
If no solution exists, then the equilibrium  level of research is zero. All the 
comparative-statics  results of Proposition  1 apply to the solution of (8.1), with 
the possible exception of (b), the effect of  y, the size of innovations.  In the 
22 Note  that 
a  m  (mA(p(n))kl1rT 
dn k-i  (r+mAp(n)) 
((  -  )mpf))k%-2  (m  (f))k-1~ 
-mAp'(n)  E  (  k  k+ 1  ) 
k= 1  (r  + mAp(n))  (r  + mAp(n)) 
m?1  (k - 
1)(mAgo(n  ))k2(  1k  -Fk-1  )  - 
k=2  (r + mAp(n)) 
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linear Cobb-Douglas  example,  however,  it can be shown that (b) remains  true, 
provided  that the social  discount  rate (the denominator  of U below)  is positive.23 
In stationary  equilibrium  each innovation raises the entire cross-sectional 
profile  of productivity  parameters  by the factor  y'l/m.  It therefore  raises  GNP by 
y  l/m  and raises the log of GNP by the factor (1/m)ln y. Since the Poisson 
arrival  rate of innovation  is mAn, therefore  the economy's  average  growth  rate 
is An  In  ly,  exactly as before. The variance  of the growth  rate is An(ln  y)2/m; 
aggregation across many sectors reduces variability  through a  law of  large 
numbers. 
By the same logic as in Section 4, social welfare is measured  by 
m 
E  Y,(1-k)ImF(  Xk  ) 
U=A0  1 
r -  mAp(n)  (y/m  -  1) 
A  social planner would choose (x1,...,  Xmn)  to maximize U subject to the 
constraint, 
(8.3)  N-n  =xl  +  +xm, 
and n > 0. The first-order  conditions  for an interior  maximum  are 
(8.4)  F'(Xk)  =pY(k-l)/m  (k = 1,.. .  m), 
(8.5)  mApD'(n)  (yl/m  -  1)U =  Ao, 
where ,u is a Lagrange  multiplier.  Let ,i(N -  n) denote the value of ,u such that 
the solutions  (x1,...,  xm) to (8.4) solve (8.3). Then (8.5) can be expressed  as: 
(8.6)  mAp(  n>)  k=1(Y  )ArP  (n*)(Y  /m  1)) 
In the linear Cobb-Douglas  example, 
(8.7)  r-A  a7  -1 
m r((-1mAn  -Y1/ 
Comparison  of (8.6) with (8.1) reveals the same four effects as before. The 
monopoly-distortion  effect  is  still  present  because  ,i(N -  n) > d^(N  -  n).  The 
23 It suffices  to show  that the right-hand  side of (8.2) is increasing  in y. The ratio  of sums  in this 
expression  can be regarded  as the expected  value of the discrete  random  variable 
Zk=  [lA  An,  k  1 + rImAn]/ 
under  the truncated  geometric  distribution  with  parameter  yl/m(a -1) < 1. The effect  on this ratio  of 
a marginal  increase in  y is the sum of the effect on each Zk  and the effect of changing  the 
parameter  of the distribution.  The former  is positive.  The latter  would  also  be positive,  by first-order 
stochastic  dominance,  if Zk  were decreasing  in k, which  it is if the social discount  rate is positive. MODEL  OF  GROWTH  349 
appropriability  effect applies sector-by-sector,  and is amplified  by the fact that 
>-l/m  >  (  mAp(n) 
r + mAp(n) J 
if the social discount rate is positive. As before, research and growth under 
laissez-faire  may be more or less than optimal; in the linear Cobb-Douglas 
example,  nt  < n* if y is large,24  but n1  > n*  if a is small and y is not too large.25 
9.  CONCLUSION 
The paper  has presented  a model of economic  growth  based on Schumpeter's 
process of creative destruction.  Growth results exclusively  from technological 
progress,  which in turn results from competition among research firms that 
generate  innovations.  Each innovation  consists  of a new intermediate  good that 
can be used to produce  final  output  more efficiently  than before. Research  firms 
are motivated  by the prospect  of monopoly  rents that can be captured  when a 
successful  innovation  is patented. But those rents in turn will be destroyed  by 
the next innovation,  which will render obsolete the existing  intermediate  good. 
It would be useful to generalize  and extend the analysis  in several  directions, 
such as assuming  that technology  is ultimately  bounded, thereby  requiring  the 
size of innovations  eventually  to fall. The model would gain richness  and realism 
if capital  were introduced,  either physical  or human  capital  embodying  technical 
change,  or R and D capital  that affects  the arrival  rate of innovations.  Allowing 
unemployment,  by introducing  search into the labor market,  would facilitate 
study of  the  reciprocal interaction between  -technological change and the 
business  cycle. All these extensions  seem feasible because of the simplicity  and 
transparency  of the basic model. 
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APPENDIX  1 
AN  EXAMPLE  WITH A  RANDOM  ARRIVAL  PARAMETER 
Let A follow a two-state  Markov  process  on the space {A1,  A2}  with all transition  probabilities 
equal to 1/2.  A stationary  equilibrium  is an equilibrium  in which the productivity-adjusted  wage 
rate depends  only on the state of the world,  not on time. Let AtVj be the value of making  the tth 
24 From  (8.7), as yl/m  rises  to the upper  limit 1 + r/mAN, n* approaches  N while,  from  (8.2),  ni 
is bounded  below N. 
25 If 1/a > 1 + rIAN  then ni  > 0 for all y, whereas  if  yllm  < 1 + arlmAN,  then n* = 0. 350  PHILIPPE  AGHION  AND  PETER  HOWITT 
innovation  and moving  into state j. Assume  the linear  case of qp(n)  =  n. In any  state i, the marginal 
expected  return  to research  in interval  t is AiAt+?(Vl + V2)/2. This will equal  the wage if positive 
research  occurs  in state i. If research  occurs  in all states,  the Vi's  must  satisfy  the analogue  to (2.12): 
Vi  r + A  i[N-y(Aiy(Vl  + V2)/2)]  (i  =  1, 2). 
Define  ni=  N -  i(Aiy(Vl  + V2)/2).  Then the average level of research employment is 
n =  nlql  + n2q2, 
where qi is the asymptotic  fraction  of time spent in state i. It is easily  verified  that 
ql  =  1 -q2  =  A2n2/(Alnl  +  A2n2). 
To complete the example, take the Cobb-Douglas case (F(x)  = xa),  and suppose a = y  =  1/2 
and r =N=  Al  =  1. Since k(co)  = (co/la2)l/(a  -)  and  r(wo)  =  ((1 -  a)/a)wA (w), the formula  for 
each Vi can be rewritten  as: 
V,  =  [16(Vl  +  V2)]  -  {1  -  [4(Vi  +  2)]  1 
and 
V2 =  [16A2(V1  +  V2)]'  -  A2{1  -  [4A2(V1  +  V2)]  2. 
When A2 = 1, the solution to these equations is V, = V2  = VT/8v'_,  which implies n, = n2 ==  1/3. 
As  A2  -*  oc, the  solution  approaches  V, = 1/4,  V2  =0,  which  implies  n, =0,  n2 = 1,  and  q1 = 
n2/(n2  + Alnl/A2)  = 1; hence  ni =  0. 
The economy's  average growth rate equals f ln y, where f  is the asymptotic  frequency  of 
innovations: 
f = Alnlql  + A2n2q2-  Al + A2  1] 
Thus when  A2  = 1, f ln y = (1/3)  ln 2 > 0;  and as A2  -+ oo,  f  In y  approaches 0. 
APPENDIX  2 
DERIVATION  OF CONDITION  (5.5) 
In the stationary  equilibrium  described  in Section 5, the monopolist  has no incentive to do 
research  if 
(A.1)  Wt  > A  ( VtM+  1-  Vt) 
where 
()//a-  1)wt(N  - 
t  r+AR 
is the value of the monopolist's  current  patent and 
[min  (y  2/a,a  1) -  1]w  A1(N-) 
Vt+l=  ~~r+An 
would  be the gross  value  of the next innovation  to the current  monopolist,  for whom  the innovation 
would be drastic  if y2 > a-',  if next period the level of research  was the stationary-equilibrium 
value nR.  In fact more than this level of research  would be conducted  if the monopolist  were to 
innovate,  because  the monopolist  could  then charge  a markup  higher  than yl/a,  so the value  would 
actually  be less than Vtm+Y.  Substituting  these expressions  for Vt and Vtm+  into (A.1) and using  the MODEL  OF  GROWTH  351 
fact that wt  + 1 =  y wt produces 
A[yi(y2/a,al)  - y  -  (yl/a  - 
_A 
(A.2)  (  foll  minm  date  from(A  a  1)](N5.7) 
r+An 
Condition (5.5) follows immediately from (A.2) and (5.7). 
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